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Accountability for Past Abuses
Juan E. M6ndez*
I. INTRODUCTION
This study focuses on the debates about holding perpetrators of massive
human rights violations accountable. It also focuses on the experience, in
Latin America and elsewhere, of attempts to restore truth and justice to the
legacy of abuse remaining from the recent past. That experience is
necessarily diverse and rich in variations, but it offers some principles of
universal applicability.
In only a few years the international community has made considerable
progress toward the recognition that a legacy of grave and systematic
violations generates obligations that the state owes to the victims and to
society. Considerable disagreement remains, however, as to the content of
those obligations and as to how they should be fulfilled. This article
attempts to show that those obligations (a) are multifaceted and can be
fulfilled separately, but (b) should not be seen as alternatives to one another.
The different obligations are not a menu from which a government can pick
a solution; they are in fact distinct duties, each one of which must be
complied with to the best of the government's abilities. In this context,
prosecutions and trials, as long as they are held under strict fair trial
guarantees, are a necessary and even desirable ingredient in any serious
effort at accountability.
This article challenges the view that because democratic leaders know
best what their societies need at any given time, the international community should not attempt to impose any rules about what should be done
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about the recent past. This article also disputes the view that democratic
leaders should strive to restore truth to the analysis of the recent past and, in
general, forego attempts to restore justice, at least by way of criminal
prosecutions (even while accepting that universal principles govern the
problem).
II. MULTIPLE DIMENSIONS OF THE ACCOUNTABILITY PROBLEM

The experience accumulated since the early 1980s on this topic continues
to be enriched. For example, the new South Africa is embarking on the most
ambitious program to combine truth telling, clemency and prosecution, and
eventual reconciliation. Undoubtedly, those who have designed the South
African program have benefitted from the Latin American and East European
experiences, but it is hard to find a place where so much thoughtfulness and
creativity has gone into this grave matter of public policy as in South Africa.
The ongoing experiment with justice that the United Nations has begun
with the creation of the war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
for Rwanda has also served to broaden horizons and challenge assumptions. Two or three years from now, analysts will have to reexamine
everything said today about truth and justice in light of what these
experiments produce.
The accountability problem has legal, ethical, and political dimensions,
and it is imperative to recognize and tackle all three. It is a mistake for the
human rights movement to allow itself to be painted into the corner of either
a "legalistic" or a "moralistic" position. Inevitably, many have seen the
movement as grossly uncompromising, intransigent, terribly naive about
political realities, vindictive, and opposed to reconciliation. One must,
therefore, be ready to take a sober and realistic view of political constraints
in proposing accountability measures. But such a view does not necessarily
result in realpolitik and surrender of principle. In fact, it is possible to argue
that a program of truth and justice is not only the right thing to do, but also
politically desirable because it goes a long way toward realizing our idea of
democracy.
III. FRAMING THE QUESTIONS

The multiplicity of dimensions mentioned above has changed the way
human rights organizations conceive their work and how they work to
promote and defend fundamental freedoms. They no longer look strictly for
the facts that constitute a violation of a universal standard, but trace how
governmental institutions respond to each episode. They apply this ap-
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proach not only to a recent epidemic of abuses directed against a political
enemy, but also to the "endemic violations" present in our democracies:
police brutality, rural violence, poor prison conditions, the plight of
minorities, and domestic violence. This notion of an institutional response
recognizes that abuses will happen even in the most advanced societies, but
correctly places the burden on the state to mobilize its resources to restore
the imbalance and provide redress. The measuring stick of true commitment
to democracy is the degree to which governments are willing to "organize
the governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through
which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of juridically
ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human rights."1
Beyond human rights work, accountability experiences inform the way
we think about the related but distinct areas of promotion of democracy,
peacemaking, and peacekeeping. Both the need to consolidate a shaky
democracy and the need to stop the fighting in a conflict situation
undoubtedly condition the possibilities of redressing past wrongs, placing
limits on what a policy of accountability can achieve. Those urgent
demands, however, by no means diminish the objectives of truth and
justice. On the contrary, it is increasingly recognized that making state
criminals accountable says something about the democracy that we are
trying to establish, and that preserving memory and settling human rights
accounts can be part of the formula for a lasting peace, as opposed to a lull
in the fighting.
Some commentators have suggested that considerations of accountability for past human rights violations arise only in the context of transitions to
democracy. Jos6 Zalaquett, in an influential article entitled Confronting
Human Rights Violations: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints,2
framed the discussion in this way, as did the US Institute of Peace in its high
quality collection of materials titled Transitional Justice.3 However, the
broad range of contexts in which accountability problems occur suggests
that accountability for past abuses must be considered not only in transitions to democracy, but in seeking solutions to armed conflicts as well.
Ending conflict situations presents political challenges to accountability
issues that are not present in transitions to democracy. For instance, in
places like El Salvador and Guatemala, the human rights movement is not
1.

Veldsquez Rodriguez Case, 9 166, Case 7920, Ser. C, No. 4, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 35, OAS
Doc. OEA/Ser.L/V/II.19/Doc.13 (1988) (judgment of 29 July 1988) [hereinafter Velsquez

2.

Jos6 Zalaquett, Confronting Human Rights Violations Committed by Former Govern-

Rodriguez Case].
ments: Principles Applicable and Political Constraints, in
PARDON (1989), reprinted in 13 HAMLINE L.REV.623 (1990).
3.

1-3
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necessarily confronting a regime that has changed, but governments coming
to grips with violations committed in great part under their own watch.
Different political considerations also arise in attempts to impose accountability through demands of the international community, as in the creation
of war crimes tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. Moreover,
restricting the analysis to transitions leaves out the approaches taken by
organizations of civil society and even by governments to overcome
impunity in situations of ongoing violations like in Colombia and Peru.
Another reason to review the analytical framework is that issues of
accountability have proven to have lives of their own. They last beyond the
short term of what can reasonably be called the transition. Witness the
renewal of public debate about what the state owes the families of the
disappeared in Argentina after the revelations of naval officer Adolfo
Scilingo in 1995, 4 and again in March 1996, on the occasion of the
twentieth anniversary of the coup d'@tat. Coming after more than a dozen
years of democracy and after the measures taken in the 1980s both to
reckon with the past and to attempt to bury it, the issue of the victims' rights
in Argentina has far exceeded the limits of the transition.
Even for clear transitional situations, this limited approach to accountability issues begins with the assumption that newly democratic governments are constrained in what they can do to correct past wrongs.' While
this assumption is correct, unfortunately it has led many to expect too little
of what governments can effectively do under the circumstances, and not
enough of what they ought to do. In regards to Latin America especially, it
has been all too common to think that any attempt to break the cycle of
impunity would threaten democratic stability, as if a lesser form of
democracy without equality before the law was all to which Latin Americans could aspire.
The framework of transitions has been extremely helpful in shaping
debates until now, but a new approach is in order. Latin American
democracies now seem more secure (whether they seem so because
impunity prevailed or because some accountability has been accomplished
is another matter), and experience shows that demands for accountability
arise in a variety of historical contexts. It may be time to look at these
problems in a broader scope.

4.

See HoRAo

5.

trans., 1996).
See generally Zalaquett, supra note 2.

VERBITSKY,
THE FLIGHT: CONFESSIONS
OF AN ARGENTINEDIRTY WARRIOR

(Esther

Allen
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IV. EMERGING PRINCIPLES
A strong legal argument can be made for an emerging principle in
international law that states have affirmative obligations in response to
massive and systematic violations of fundamental rights. 6 Although existing

international instruments do not specify the content of those obligations, the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) establishes that
each state party to the instrument "undertakes to respect and to ensure to all
individuals"" the rights it recognizes. The duty to ensure means that states
are obliged to take specific steps to redress the wrong committed by each
violation of a right. In addition, most instruments establish the right of the
victim of a violation to an effective remedy and to equal protection of the
laws without discrimination.9 The UN Human Rights Committee, which is
the authoritative interpreter of the ICCPR, 10 has said that blanket amnesty
laws and pardons are inconsistent with the Covenant because they create "a
climate of impunity" and deny the victims this "right to a remedy.""
International law also specifies that certain rights are so fundamental that

6.

See Diane F. Orentlicher, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights
Violations of a Prior Regime, 100 YALEL.J. 2537, 2551-94 (1991); Diane F. Orentlicher,
Addressing Gross Human Rights Abuses: Punishment and Victim Compensation, in
HUMAN RIGHTS: AN AGENDA FORTHE NEXT CENTURY (Louis Henkin & John L. Hargrove eds.,
1994); see also NAOMI ROHT-ARRIAZA, IMPUNITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONALLAW AND
PRACTICE
(1995). Two Special Rapporteurs appointed by the United Nations have had
occasion to explore this obligation in depth. See Theo Van Boven, Special Rapporteur on

Restitution, Compensation and Reparations for Gross and Consistent Violations of
Human Rights, Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation
for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, U.N. ESCOR,
Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 45th Sess., Provisional Agenda Item 4, at 16-20, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8 (1993); Question of impunity of perpetrators of violations of
human rights (civil and political rights): final report prepared by Mr. L. Joinet, pursuant to
Subcommission resolution 1995/35, U.N. ESCOR, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., 48th Sess.,
Provisional Agenda Item 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/18 (1996).
7.

8.
9.
10.
11.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 999

U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force 23 Mar. 1976), G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 16), at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) [hereinafter ICCPRI.
Id. art. 2.
E.g., id. arts. 14, 26; American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 24, 25, opened for
signature 22 Nov. 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into
force 18 July 1978) [hereinafter American Convention].
ICCPR, supra note 7.
Comments of the Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, 9D10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/Add.46
(1995) (Comments on Periodic Report by Argentina) [hereinafter Comments on Periodic
Report by Argentina]. Recently, the Human Rights Committee had occasion to issue a
similar condemnation of blanket amnesties in commenting on Peru's periodic report.
Preliminary Observation of the Human Rights Committee, Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/79/
Add.67 (1996).
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they cannot be suspended even in the event of an emergency that threatens
the life of the nation or its national security. Those "core rights" are the ones
that are violated by extrajudicial execution, torture, disappearances, and
prolonged arbitrary arrests.12 Immunity for these crimes constitutes an
impermissible ex post facto derogation of rights which could not have been
suspended at the time the acts were committed.
Many binding norms of international law point in the direction of an
obligation to overcome impunity for crimes of this kind. The Genocide
Convention 3 establishes the obligation to punish."4 The more recent Torture
Convention s obliges its signatories to make torture punishable within their
domestic jurisdictions, to arrest suspected torturers, to extradite them to
other jurisdictions or to prosecute them, and to cooperate fully with the6
prosecuting jurisdiction in the gathering and preservation of evidence.
Other conventions and customary norms rule on the inapplicability of
statutes of limitations to crimes against humanity, on the inapplicability of
the "political offense" defense against extradition for such crimes, and on
17
universal jurisdiction to prosecute them.

A. Four Obligations and Correlative Rights
Taken as a whole, these scattered norms point unequivocally to a trend in
international law to punish the perpetrators of these crimes. In fact, it is hard
to find disagreement on the point that the crimes' occurrence gives rise to

12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

ICCPR, supra note 7, art. 4; American Convention, supra note 9, art. 27.
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 9 Dec. 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force 12 Jan. 1951) (entered into force for U.S. 23 Feb.
1989).
Id. art. 1.
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, adopted 10 Dec. 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1985), reprinted in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), substantive changes
noted in 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) (entered into force 26 June 1987).
Id. arts. 4-9.
The "political offense" defense to extradition is a customary law doctrine widely
included in bilateral extradition treaties. In general, a state will refuse to extradite a
suspect to another country if the crime for which he is sought is a politically motivated
one. However, the exception does not apply if the crime that the suspect is alleged to
have committed is considered a crime against humanity, even if it was also politically
motivated. Some instruments addressing human rights crimes make this defense to
extradition inapplicable. See, e.g., Louis Joinet, Draft International Convention on the
Prevention and Repression of Forced Disappearances, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/NG.1/
CRP.2 (1996) (currently under discussion by the UN Commission on Human Rights);
Inter-American Convention on the Forced Disappearance of Persons, adopted 9 June
1994, art. 5, OAS Doc. OEA/Ser.P/AG/Doc.3114/94 (1994) (not in force), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1529 (1994).
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certain obligations; if anything, the disagreement (or skepticism) is on the
content of the obligation or on its justiciability-though the latter is a
problem for all international law obligations. Observation of this trend and
other trends to expand universally applicable norms suggests that new
principles are emerging. These principles hold that a state is obliged to carry
out a number of tasks in response to crimes against humanity. These tasks are:
1. to investigate, prosecute, and punish the perpetrators;
2. to disclose to the victims, their families, and society all that can be
reliably established about those events;
3. to offer the victims adequate reparations; and
4. to separate known perpetrators from law enforcement bodies and
other positions of authority.
Some of these obligations are present when the state violates any right
set forth in the universal instruments. The whole complex of obligations,
however, applies only to situations of massive and systematic violations of
the most basic rights to life, liberty, and physical integrity. In other words, a
single case of torture gives rise to these obligations only if it is part and
parcel of a systematic pattern of similar violations. The reason for this
heightened protection is that human rights violations of this magnitude,
when committed massively and systematically, are crimes against humanity.
From the point of view of individual and collective persons entitled to a
specific duty from the state, the state's obligations correspond to a set of rights:
1. a right of the victim to see justice done;
2. a right to know the truth;
3. an entitlement to compensation and also to nonmonetary forms of
restitution; and
4. a right to new, reorganized, and accountable institutions.
Society at large and not the victim is the titular head of this last right; for the
first three, the right lies first and foremost with the victims and their families,
and then with society.
The reference to these correlative rights and obligations as "emerging
principles" and not as binding international law obligations signifies their
present status: only in part do they find justification in existing norms of
universal applicability. These rights and obligations result primarily from the
recent expansion of existing norms through the creation of law, particularly
international law in the form of nonbinding resolutions, judicial and quasijudicial precedent, the practice of nations, and opinio juris. For example,
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the Geneva Conventions of 194918 clearly establish an obligation to punish
"grave breaches" or war crimes that happen in international conflict. In the
last year alone, that notion has been extended to similar crimes committed
in the context of conflicts not of an international character. The Security
Council resolution establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda and the landmark jurisdictional decision of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in the Tadic case1 9 both led to
this extension. With respect to the right to know the truth, even though the
international community has only recently begun discussing this right, a
recent meeting of experts convened by the United Nations has argued that
the right to know the truth has achieved the status of a customary
international law norm.20
These examples indicate that the law on this issue is developing rapidly.
The fact that these principles are not "hard law" in all their aspects,
furthermore, does not mean that they do not constitute obligations. In most
cases it may not be possible to obtain a judgment ordering performance of
these duties, and such a judgment would be hard to enforce in any case.
Nevertheless, these principles can be invoked to advocate certain measures
by states that like to see themselves as contributing to an international
lawful order. More importantly, a government that confronts a situation of
massive state crimes can and should be judged by how much it attempts to
do in order to comply with these principles.

18.

Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in

Armed Forces in the Field (Geneva I),opened for signature 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114,
T.I.A.S. No. 3362, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered into force 21 Oct. 1950) (entered into force

for U.S. 2 Feb. 1956); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea (Geneva II), opened

for signature 12 Aug. 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, T.I.A.S. No. 3363, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered
into force 21 Oct. 1950) (entered into force for U.S. 2 Feb. 1956); Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War (Geneva Ill), opened for signature 12 Aug.
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into force 21 Oct.
1950) (entered into force for U.S. 2 Feb. 1956); Geneva Convention Relative to the
opened for signature 12 Aug.
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva IV),

19.

20.

1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, T.I.A.S. No. 3365, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force 21 Oct.
1950) (entered into force for U.S. 2 Feb. 1956) [hereinafter Geneva IV].
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, App. Chamber, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion of
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, The Hague, 2 Oct. 1995. See also Theodore Meron,
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 554 (1995).
Eighth annual report and list of States which, since 1 January 1985, have proclaimed,
extended or terminated a state of emergency, presented by Mr. Leonardo Despouy,
Special Rapporteur appointed pursuant to Economic and Social Council resolution 1985/
37, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1995/20/Corr.1 (1995).
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B. The Obligations Are Separate and Distinct
A second observation with regard to the four state obligations is that each of
them is both integral to a fair policy of accountability and yet separate and
distinct from the other three. Every government should strive to comply with
each one of these obligations, and a high measure of compliance in one
area does not excuse noncompliance in another. For example, the Menem
administration in Argentina has enacted a comprehensive and generous
policy of monetary compensation available to victims of the "dirty war" of
the 1970s, but does little to tell each family of the disappeared what can be
known about the fate and whereabouts of their loved ones, and then only
upon request and in the most quiet of ways. 21 The government has done
even less to purge the armed and security forces of the many perpetrators
that continue to serve and advance through the ranks.
The separate and distinct nature of these obligations also dictates,
however, that if one of these duties is rendered legally or factually
impossible, for example by a blanket amnesty law which prevents criminal
prosecutions, the other duties remain in full force. The UN Human Rights
Committee, in its latest periodic review of Argentina, 22 rightly rejected the
argument put forth by Minister of Justice Rodolfo Barra that the pseudoamnesty laws of the 1980s and the presumption of innocence prevented the
government from forcing known criminals into retirement by administrative
or disciplinary procedures. 23 Similarly, those laws may be insurmountable
barriers to criminal prosecution, but they do not relieve the Argentine
government from its duty to use all the means at its disposal to tell each
family what can be known about the fate and whereabouts of the
24
disappeared.

21.

22.
23.
24.

See Decree No. 70, 1991 (Arg.) (providing reparations for victims of administrative
detention during the "dirty war" who brought lawsuits); Law No. 24043, 1992 (Arg.)
(providing reparations for "dirty war" detainees who did not bring lawsuits); Law No.
24321, 1994 (Arg.) (providing mechanism for family of disappeared person to have court
declare him or her "absent"); Law No. 24411, 1995, as amended (Arg.) (providing
reparations for families of disappeared persons). The Under-Secretariat of Human Rights
of the Ministry of Interior is in possession of the Sabato Commission files, and provides
additional information on what can be established about the fate and whereabouts of the
disappeared to families that request it.
See Comments on Periodic Report by Argentina, supra note 11.
Id. 9 10.
See Human Rights Watch/Americas & Center for Justice and International Law Brief
Amicus Curiae in support of Motion by Emilio F. Mignone, In re ESMA Case (CFed.),
8834 E.D. 1 (1995), reprinted in 21 REvISTAIIDH 149 (1995). See also German J. Bidart
Campos, La Victima del Delito y el Proceso Penal, 8834 E.D. 7 (a supportive note by one
of Latin America's leading constitutional and international law scholars). Jos6 Zalaquett
developed the notion that the state owes each victim an individualized "truth," and that,
therefore, a comprehensive report merely chronicling a government's practices and
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This analysis of the four obligations and their correlative rights has the
advantage of allowing the international community to insist on certain
measures beyond the artificial attempt by governments to draw a line on the
matter and "move on." The approach should also serve as a way for the
human rights movement to avoid self-defeatism and reject all solutions
because one of them, punishment, becomes unavailable. While continuing
to condemn amnesties and pardons as inconsistent with these obligations,
the victims and society can still demand the complete truth, reparations,
and law enforcement bodies that are effectively purged of criminals.

C. Obligations of Means, Not of Results
A third and final observation about these principles is that, in all four cases,
they constitute, in the familiar distinction made by civil law, "obligations of
means" and not of "results." This means that a state fully complies with its
duty to punish even if the trial results in acquittal, as long as the prosecution
has been conducted in good faith and not as a ritual "preordained to be
ineffective."2" In that regard, these obligations are subject to conditions of
legitimacy in their performance. 26 These conditions constrain governments
in two opposite directions. In the first place, governments are mandated to
make good faith efforts to achieve the desired results. It follows that, if a
government has leads, documentation, known actors whose testimony can
be obtained, and so on, it has a duty to do all that is reasonably within its
means to tell each family the truth. In this context, however, "reasonably
within its means" signifies an affirmative organization of efforts and tasks
that must be placed in the service of truth, not merely a pro forma act of
bureaucratic compliance.

27

In the opposite direction, another condition of legitimacy is that these
efforts must be conducted in full respect for due process standards
mandated by international law. 28 What process is "due" depends, however,
on the object of the exercise and its likely result. 29 Prosecution and
punishment require the highest degree of deference for the rights of the
accused because the outcome may be the loss of liberty of a person.30 On

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

policies does not satisfy the state's obligation. Zalaquett, supra note 2, at 629. At his
urging, this notion was adopted by the Rettig Commission in Chile. Informe de la
Comisi6n Nacional de Verdad y Reconciliaci6n, Tomo I, at 3 (1991).
See Velasquez Rodriguez Case, supra note 1, 9 177.
Zalaquett, supra note 2, at 628-33.
Id. at 629-32.
Id. at 633.
Id.
Id. at 633, 636.
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the other hand, disciplinary or administrative separation from the armed or
security force requires, arguably, a lesser standard of due process.31
Considerable dispute exists in this regard on the issue of whether truth
commissions should "name names" of officials accused of the violations
they describe. Zalaquett objects to naming names under all circumstances,
considering it a violation of the due process rights of the persons so named
and also an invasion of judicial functions that truth commissions, by
definition, do not exercise.3 2 An absolute position against naming names,
however, can in certain circumstances result in an unacceptable limitation
of the "full truth" that governments are bound to disclose and that truth
commissions are charged with rendering.
The legitimacy of a decision-either to name names or to withhold
them-depends on whether prosecutions and trials (and with them a more
exhaustive exploration of the truth) are available after the truth commission
issues its report. If the possibility of trials is open, it is perhaps a good idea
to allow the courts to rule on matters of personal criminal liability after a fair
trial takes place-a fair trial necessitating the withholding of names in the
truth commission report. If, on the other hand, the report is likely to be the
last opportunity to air these matters, an honest deference to truth suggests
the need to disclose reliable information about the behavior of certain
individuals because they can hide behind the impunity given to them by
amnesties or pardons. Even in that case, however, some measure of due
process is necessary: at the very least, the truth commission is required to
give them a chance to rebut the incriminating information. If names are
going to be named, it is also important that the truth commission deal
honestly and impartially with the information and be perceived by the
public as having done so. Because the Truth Commission for El Salvador
was widely seen as having received many more names than it published,
the duty should have been incumbent upon it to be more clear and
forthright as to the criteria by which some names were published while
other names were suppressed. Possibly improving on that experience, the
South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission is charged not only
with investigating and disclosing the circumstances of each case, but also
with identifying the perpetrators.3 3 At the same time, however, the statute
that created the Commission requires that persons accused of human rights
31.

Id. at 633.

32.

Jos6 Zalaquett, inDEALING WITH THE PAST: TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 51 (Alex
Boraine et al. eds., 1994). The UN-sponsored Truth Commission for El Salvador was the
first of the recent vintage to "name names." Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth
Commissions-1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HuM. RTs. Q. 597, 601-03, 649
(1994).
Republic of South Africa, Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Bill (1995) (on
file with author).

33.
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violations be given a chance to respond before their names find their way to
34
the final report.
V. AVOIDING FALSE DILEMMAS
A. Misconception One: There Are No Rules for States
The first misconception about the accountability problem is that there are
no rules governing what states must do in response to massive violations
that occurred in the recent past. Early in the 1980s, this view prevailed
among many democratic and even human rights minded observers of Latin
America. This mind-set resulted in a lack of support for efforts to inaugurate
an era of accountability in the new wave of democratization. The views of
former President Jimmy Carter most prominently reflect this position in its
present incarnation. The position not only defers to the judgment of
democratic leaders but expresses a preference for settlement of disputes
based on forgiving and forgetting by fiat. In fact, President Carter most
recently applied this idea in his offer of amnesty to General Raoul Cedras as
a condition for allowing democracy to return to Haiti, an offer made over
the express objections of Haiti's democratically elected leader, JeanBertrand Aristide.
President Carter explains that he is less concerned about the past
violations than about avoiding "the next ones." Even so, it is far from proven
that a policy of forgiving and forgetting automatically deters future abuses.
In fact, at least in Haiti one can more easily make the case that the opposite
is true: each self-amnesty by the military has only led to further interruptions
of democracy and to further atrocities.3" This deference to democratically
elected leaders, who supposedly know better than anyone what is best for
their country and what the traffic will bear, is unwarranted. In the mid
1980s, such deference allowed Guatemala's President Vinicio Cerezo to get
away with actively impeding any attempt to invalidate the shameless selfamnesty with which his military predecessors left office; at the end of
Cerezo's term, members of the military committed more violations of
human rights with further impunity.

36

34.

Id. arts. 4(a), 31(2), 38.

35.

Kenneth Roth, Human Rights in the Haitian Transition to Democracy, in
AND POLITICAL TRANSITIONS: GETTYSBURG
TO BOSNIA

36.

HUMAN RIGHTS

(Carla Hesse & Robert Post eds.) (forthcom-

ing 1997).
A few days before Cerezo was inaugurated, the military enacted a sweeping self-amnesty
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his party members to defeat the bill. During his term there were at least two more
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covering human rights abuses as well.
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B. Misconception Two: Truth Is Always Preferable to Justice
A second pernicious position in this debate postulates that, even in the
context of trying to settle accounts, truth is always preferable to justice.
Columnist Charles Krauthammer, relying in part on Zalaquett's ideas and
presumably extolling the virtues of the Chilean and South African experiences, has recently offered as a proposition that "truth reports" should be
written but no trials should take place.3 7 With respect to the crisis in Bosnia,
some observers have proposed closing down the war crimes tribunal and
replacing it with a "truth commission" modeled after those in Chile and El
Salvador.38
In arguing that truth telling always promotes reconciliation while trials
are vindictive, Krauthammer simplifies the facts about the positions espoused by Chile's new democratic leaders and by Nelson Mandela. He fails
to take into account that Chile successfully prosecuted and convicted
Pinochet's right-hand henchman, General Manuel Contreras, and that
Mandela has allowed justice to take its course in the case against former
defense minister, General Magnus Malan. Contreras is serving time in jail
and Malan spent several months behind bars before being acquitted, while
Mandela steadfastly refused to intervene. Does that mean that Aylwin and
Frei and Mandela have turned vindictive?
It is hard to see what could possibly be gained by another "truth report"
in the Balkans, after UN thematic and country-specific rapporteurs have
documented the crimes so painstakingly while the international community
prefers not to hear. The United Nations has had a "truth commission" for the
former Yugoslavia already, in the form of the commission headed by
Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, which preceded the creation of the special
tribunal.39 Incidentally, every eminent jurist appointed by the United
Nations has proposed that the next inevitable step should be to do justice;
Robert Pastor and David Forsythe suggest that the human rights movement
should ignore these recommendations until there is a commission that
proposes immunity."
37.
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It is of course true that a process of accountability that neglects or
downplays the truth would be unacceptable. Zalaquett even includes full
knowledge of the truth as one of his "conditions of legitimacy."41 A policy
that might result in convictions without a full airing of the facts, say by plea
bargaining, would not pass muster. That is not the same as saying that truth
is preferable or superior to justice, or even that truth telling should come
first.4 2 Other than in the unlikely plea bargaining scenario, a trial without

full discussion of the facts would violate due process in any event. More
importantly, posing the question as a contest between truth and justice fails
to give credit to prosecutions for their specific contribution to the public's
knowledge of the facts.
In the position exemplified by Krauthammer, Pastor, and Forsythe, truth
is actually proposed as an alternative to justice. In fact, the best exercises in
truth telling so far have not been predicated on the prospect of immunity
from prosecutions. Both the Sabato commission in Argentina and the Rettig
commission in Chile withheld names of accused perpetrators in their final
reports, but submitted them with the relevant evidence to the courts as a
way of contributing to justice.43 If the commissions had been charged with
telling the facts as the last step in accountability, their reports without names
probably would have been received less favorably by the public; the "truth"
they were telling would have been perceived as a preordained and
incomplete one and not as a truth that lets all the facts speak for themselves,
and leading to wherever it should.
The third Latin American exercise in truth telling was, in fact, the last
word to be heard on accountability in El Salvador. The three international
jurists who formed the UN-sponsored Truth Commission decided to be
silent in their report on the matter of an eventual amnesty, despite the fact
that the Salvadoran government had talked openly about one. 44 In press
statements in the days following publication of their report, each of the
commissioners specifically argued against a blanket amnesty, but to no
avail. President Alfredo Cristiani and the Congress dominated by his party
immediately passed an unconditional amnesty law. Whatever the intentions
of the Truth Commission members, Cristiani's amnesty actually took away
much of the weight that the report otherwise would have had in Salvadoran
41.
42.
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society. Despite the subsequent impunity, if the report did contribute to
peace in that country, it was precisely because the investigation that
preceded it was not premised on a preordained amnesty. In contrast, a truth
report designed as an alternative to justice would have been an exercise in
tokenism, and as such it would have been doomed to be forgotten rather
quickly by the society it purported to serve. Justifiably, the public expects
the truth telling to be a step in the direction of accountability, not a poor
alternative to it.
This is not to say that we should reject truth commissions unless
prosecutions and punishment are also on the horizon. As stated earlier, if
punishment is rendered legally or factually impossible within legitimate
conditions, the state is still obligated to investigate and disclose the facts, to
acknowledge the wrongs committed in its name. However, that situation is
different from the one in which governments sanction impunity and, as a
gesture to the victims, give them a report instead, hoping that everything
will soon be forgotten.
The success of national truth commissions has prompted the international community to use the model in situations in which a state or its
citizens calls on the community to help put an end to a conflict. The United
Nations proposed and funded the Truth Commission for El Salvador and,
more recently, the one in Haiti. The former was composed only of nonSalvadorans; the latter included a minority of three non-Haitians. Of these,
the human rights movement generally considers the Salvadoran effort
successful because its report is a credible, persuasive, and honest appraisal
of the atrocities committed during the twelve year war in that country. Its
silence over the amnesty question and the controversy over names named
and names not named are negative factors. More importantly, the fact that
the commission was formed and staffed exclusively by non-Salvadorans
also limits its value: the different sectors of Salvadoran society see the final
document as yet another external "report" on their country and have not
taken stock of its findings.4 s The Haiti Truth Commission is much more
decidedly a failure. After months of deliberation it resolved not to publish its
report and to release only a few pages of inane "recommendations." Six
months later the Commission did release its full report, but printed and
distributed only a small number of copies. A truth commission that
withholds publication of its own findings is at the very least a contradiction
in terms.
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The UN involvement in the efforts in Haiti and El Salvador does not
explain their partial failures. In addition to being simplistic, such an
assessment would be terribly unfair to international commissioners and staff
who tried their best to make the most of very difficult situations. It is fair to
say that truth commissions succeed when they are seen by the public as an
effort by a national community to come to grips with its own reality of
atrocious behavior by its members toward one another. In this regard,
President Nelson Mandela, heeding the advice of a community panel that
proposed candidates for the Commission on Truth and Reconciliation,
correctly decided not to use the slots for foreign members contemplated in
the statute and filled the Commission exclusively with South Africans. This
conviction that truth telling efforts are primarily a national enterprise leads
one to be highly skeptical of a recent proposal to create a UN-sponsored
"permanent truth commission. " " As mentioned elsewhere, the special
rapporteurs, working groups, and other UN mechanisms do an uneven but
generally adequate job of describing the facts and analyzing them in light of
international human rights law; there is no need for a permanent body
which would only duplicate them. What matters most to the international
community is seeing justice done. The proposal for a permanent truth
commission does not intend to belittle the importance of the success of the
tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, but it does miss the
point that the major challenge ahead is to uphold the decisions of those
tribunals and not to let world leaders find excuses to ignore them.
To the extent that the "truth as an alternative" position cites Zalaquett,
it misrepresents his views. Zalaquett has frequently agreed that crimes
against humanity give rise to an obligation to punish, even while arguing
that this concept needed further elaboration. 48 He has also never suggested
that states should not punish when they can, but rather that the rest of the
world should not hold them to a high standard of achievement in that
regard. In addition, he has praised President Aylwin for not broadening the
scope of immunity in Chile, as opposed to the pseudo-amnesty laws passed
49
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It would be a mistake, however, to assume that Krauthammer and others
have simply not read Zalaquett carefully. Zalaquett's articles do favor truth
telling over justice and reflect skepticism about prosecutions. His insistence
that leaders who must reckon with a legacy of human rights violations must
be guided by an "ethics of responsibility" reinforces that impression. 0
Zalaquett quotes Max Weber for the need to follow an "ethics of responsibility" as opposed to an "ethics of convictions"" (also translated as an
"ethics of ultimate ends").12 What this distinction actually adds to the debate
is unclear because, according to Zalaquett, Weber readily acknowledges
that, just as an ethic of responsibility does not imply a lack of conviction,
neither does an ethic of convictions imply a lack of responsibility.
Weber has contributed greatly to modern sociology, but the incursion
into moral philosophy that Zalaquett cites is less convincing. That every
person should act responsibly (in the sense of measuring the likely though
unwanted results of one's own actions) does not say much about the
intrinsic morality or immorality of those actions. In fact, it leads to judging
those actions exclusively by those unwanted results and not by the purposes
or means of human conduct. In this sense, Weber's dichotomy aligns
Zalaquett with a consequentialist philosophy that is increasingly called into
question. More precisely, applying the "ethics of responsibility" to issues of
accountability means that going too far in the direction of accountability
creates the serious risk that the enemies of justice, who still retain residual
power, will interrupt democracy again and return to a policy of human
rights violations. That may well be so, but an "ethics of responsibility"
analysis unfairly burdens the well-intentioned democratic forces with all the
consequences of a bad result-a result which is owed primarily to the
behavior of other actors, and only secondarily, if at all, to that of the
democrats.
It is easy to agree that it makes no sense to urge leaders to act recklessly
or irresponsibly. Insisting on punishment without due process and in
disregard for the principles of res judicata, for example, would be irresponsible not because of the consequences (the reactions of the enemies of
democracy), but because the quest for justice would thereby surrender the
moral high ground of principle. In the absence of insurmountable legal
obstacles to prosecutions, however, the problem lies with establishing the
limits of what can be accomplished within the cards that the particularities
of each transition have dealt each society. Urging leaders first and foremost
to "be responsible" seems to open a large door to excuses for inaction and
50.
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for accepting the status quo of impunity for egregious abuses. Worse, it
conveys the message that it is highly ethical to govern by yielding to the
blatant blackmail of powerful undemocratic forces.
In particular, setting a universal standard of "responsible leadership"
without simultaneously stressing the debts that are owed to the victims
assumes that prosecutions are inherently destabilizing, while a truth
commission report will presumably be swallowed more easily by the
enemies of democracy. Experience shows, however, that those enemies are
probably just as terrified at the prospect of truth being revealed as they are
that some of them will have to face trials. It would be best if the
international community strongly set forth the duties owed to the victims
and to society, and then carefully and in a particularized way analyzed what
can be done and what would be irresponsible to attempt.
The emphasis on the limits as opposed to the possibilities also assumes
that whatever is done is the most that could have been done under the
circumstances. Although each transition is certainly different, this cannot
possibly account for the wide gap between how much accountability was
accomplished in Argentina compared to Uruguay or Brazil, for example,
unless one incorporates the factor of the relative adherence of political
leaders to the values of human rights and the rule of law, as well as the
ability of the human rights movement (domestic as well as international) to
push its agenda onto the national debate. Highly respected democratic
leaders like Julio Sanguinetti and Wilson Ferreira of Uruguay could claim to
have been acting responsibly when they lent their influence to a policy of
immunity that yielded to the blackmail of the Uruguayan military.s3 In
retrospect, it would have been helpful if Sanguinetti and Ferreira would
have heard a stronger voice of support from the international community for
the efforts of the Uruguayan victims and human rights community to set the
record straight.
Undoubtedly, to insist on prosecutions in the presence of an important
legal obstacle like a preexisting amnesty law that has had firm legal effects
would be irresponsible, because it would subvert the very rule of law that
53.
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the human rights movement proclaims and because it would violate the
cardinal principle of nullum crimen nulla poena sine lege (defendants are
always entitled to be judged by the criminal law most benevolent to them
that exists at or after the time of the commission of the crime). Advocating
amnesties and pardons to be enacted by democratic authorities is quite a
different matter. In the case of Chile, one can accept the objective
limitations that Pinochet's orderly retreat has put on the new democratic
government, without prejudice to criticizing the self-amnesty of 1978 as a
shameful act. The international community should praise Chilean society
for its ability to produce a great deal of accountability within those objective
limitations, but there is no need to turn necessity into virtue.

C. Misconception Three: Prosecutions Are Inherently
Inimical to Peace and Reconciliation
A frequent misconception in this debate is that prosecutions are inherently
inimical to peace and to reconciliation. Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions5 4 (applicable to internal conflicts of a particularly intense nature)
actually promotes broad and generous mutual amnesties to put an end to
the conflict."5 That amnesty, however, refers to the offenses of rebellion or
sedition and to comparably minor infractions of the laws of war on the
governmental side. It is not meant to encourage immunity for attacks on
civilians or for serious crimes against life and the integrity of the person of
the adversary. For "grave breaches" of the laws of war, on the contrary, there
is a clear obligation to punish.5 6 Beyond the question of a binding legal
obligation, however, the threat of prosecution can be a clear disincentive for
actors in an armed conflict to give up their resort to violence. At the same
time, it does not necessarily follow that the interest of peace can only be
served in these cases by a blanket amnesty for both sides. In fact, one can
make a strong argument that a lasting peace is only possible if the process
by which it is attained carefully and honestly addresses human rights and
laws of war violations by all sides.
That the object of the whole exercise is to obtain reconciliation in
societies torn by conflict should be undisputed. Unfortunately, the human
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rights movement has been reluctant to embrace reconciliation as a goal,
perhaps because as used by the proponents of immunity, the word has
achieved a bad name. The net result, in any case, is that human rights
organizations have been unjustly labeled as enemies of reconciliation and
obstacles to leaving the past behind. Human rights organizations should,
instead, adopt reconciliation as their own agenda, but insist on its true
meaning. In the first place, true reconciliation cannot be imposed by
decree; it has to be built in the hearts and minds of all members of society
through a process that recognizes every human being's worth and dignity.
Second, reconciliation requires knowledge of the facts. Forgiveness cannot
be demanded (or even expected) unless the person who is asked to forgive
knows exactly what it is that he or she is forgiving. Third, reconciliation can
only come after atonement. It seems to add a new unfairness to the crimes
of the past to demand forgiveness from the victims without any gesture of
contrition or any acknowledgement of wrongdoing from those who will
benefit from that forgiveness.
A final objection to prosecutions is that they stand no chance of
addressing all the possible violations or of trying every single perpetrator.
This inevitable selectivity discredits the effort because it instantly smacks of
discrimination and favoritism. s7 The risk of selectivity is present in truth
telling exercises as well, although this fact does not seem to bother
proponents of truth reports as alternatives to justice. Selectivity is certainly
inevitable, but it is also part of the rules of the game of trials. No system of
justice in the world even pretends that it punishes each and every case of
antinormative behavior. In cases of this sort, an initial self-selecting factor
exists in the fact that the evidence needed to initiate prosecutions will
plainly be lacking in many cases. If all perpetrators were bound to be
convicted and punished without regard to the evidence, the trials would not
be consistent with the rule of law. Cases can be lost for lack of evidence and
should be lost if fair trial guarantees are violated; this chance element and
especially the fact that all defendants have the opportunity to prevail iswhat
distinguishes fair trials from mockeries of justice."' Beyond that, a certain
selection on the basis of degrees of culpability is not only necessary but
quite legitimate. There is nothing wrong with selectivity as long as the rules
are clear and do not discriminate on the basis of a proscribed category.5 9
Those rules should also be reasonable and clear to the public, and not
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subject to change to suit the political needs of the moment or in response to
undue pressures on the democratic leadership. 60 Human rights activists
largely agree that prosecutions should start at the top where possible,
without, however, allowing "due obedience" to orders as a defense where a
clear opportunity to resist an immoral order was available.

VI. ARGUMENTS FAVORING PROSECUTIONS
A. Moral justifications for Prosecutions

These ideas are not meant to establish an absolute preference for prosecutions over truth telling or the other two state obligations for dealing with
accountability.61 As stated earlier, the state must meet all four obligations to
the best of its abilities. However, the obligations definitely conflict with a
rationale that makes prosecutions less preferable. One cannot question that
prosecutions are the hardest choice of the four paths and should therefore
be thoroughly justified in moral terms.
In this sense, a position that justifies prosecution exclusively on the
basis of its deterrent effect does not provide a sufficient foundation on which
to advocate trials. As Aryeh Neier has said repeatedly, deterrence of future
violations is unreliable as the foundation of punishment because one cannot
predict the future behavior of the relevant actors. 62 Societies can only hope
that punishment will deter the transgressor as well as other potential
offenders, but they can never assume deterrence. As the human rights
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movement justifiably criticizes the dogma that accepts the death penalty as
an effective deterrent to crime when statistical information proves the
contrary, the movement cannot just as easily affirm that prosecution and
punishment of state crimes will prevent future violations by the same or by
other state actors. In some country-specific situations one can certainly
show that a policy of impunity-by way of repeated amnesty laws or simply
de facto refusal to investigate crimes of the security forces-results in
encouragement of further human rights violations. 63 But the converse is not
necessarily true. It may well be true that in a given situation a policy
favoring forgiveness is better suited to avoiding the recurrence of egregious
violations, but that proposition cannot be proven categorically.
Together with deterrence, retribution is the object traditionally assigned
to criminal punishment. For the present purposes, it seems unnecessary to
"sign up" to one theory of punishment or the other. Provisionally, however,
deterrence alone does not seem to explain why societies punish, even
though deterrence may well be the goal that is hoped for each time a
criminal sanction is meted out. Societies punish offenders in some situations
in which recurrence is unlikely and in which the deterrent effect over the
conduct of others is not demonstrable.
That modern penology strives for rehabilitation of the offender does not
contradict a theory of punishment that recognizes some place for retribution
because rehabilitation is the object of the penalty, not the reason why the
behavior is penalized. In any event, one need not see retribution as a policy
of vindictiveness. In its true form, it simply says that society does not brook
behavior that breaks the rules. This policy is all the more important when
those rules protect the innocent and defenseless. An enlightened theory of
punishment, therefore, puts the victim at the center of the need to redress
wrongs: societies punish because they wish to signify to the victim that his
or her plight will not go unheeded. 64 This is not tantamount to resurrecting
a theory of "victims' rights" which, in the United States, is often used to tie
the hands of judges in imposing penalties, including capital punishment,
and on occasion even invoked to justify removing a prosecutor from a case
6
because the prosecutor's "toughness" does not match that of the politician. 1
Victims do not have a right to a certain form or amount of penalty, but they
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do have a right to see justice done by means of a process. Zalaquett's
concern, therefore, that victims should not have a veto over how society
decides to punish is misplaced. Majorities in society do not have a right to
tell the victims that their cases will be forgotten for the sake of a higher
"good." Victims have a right to a process that fully restores them in the
enjoyment of their rights and in the dignity and worth that society owes to
each of its members. Clemency, if advisable, can only come after that
process is fulfilled.
A moral justification of punishment offered in Argentina is probably a
variation of a "just deserts" theory, but it is especially attractive in this
setting. The theory holds that societies must punish acts of torture, murder,
and disappearance out of respect for the norm that prohibits such conduct.
The purpose of punishment reaches beyond merely restoring the rule of law
and of doing so simply because the rule of law protects the individual
against other powers in society. The heightened value of those particular
norms (i.e., prohibiting torture, state-sponsored murder, and disappearance)
gives rise to the duty to punish them. 66 In countries striving to move out of
dictatorship and authoritarianism, this argument tells much about the new
society that the people are trying to establish. In those cases, therefore,
societies punish torture, murder, and disappearances out of a desire to draw
a "thick line" with the past: from now on there will be no privileged
defendants, the plight of 7victims will not go unrecognized, and the abuse of
6
power will be checked.

A final argument for prosecutions is that they are the most effective
means of separating collective guilt from individual guilt, and thus to
remove the stigma of historic misdeeds from the innocent members of
communities that are collectively blamed for the atrocities committed on
other communities. Judge Richard Goldstone, the General Prosecutor for
the international criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda
recently made an eloquent plea to that effect. 68 This argument is especially

applicable to situations where the human rights movement seeks to break
the cycle of ethnic violence because trials would allow the victimized
communities to distinguish between ordinary members of rival ethnic
groups and those who manipulate their fears for political ends. It also
applies, however, mutatis mutandi, to countries in which the abuses were
not linked to ethnic strife. In Argentina, for example, the civilian population
66.
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might today be more reconciled with democratic armed institutions if the
pseudo-amnesties had not allowed the relative minority of very culpable
officers to seek refuge in a misguided esprit de corps. As it happened, it is
taking a long time for Argentines to recognize that it was a gang of
murderers in uniform and not necessarily the armed forces as such that
committed the massacres of the 1970s.
B. Trials and Memory

Even from the perspective of the all-important goal of telling the truth where
the killers cling to silence and denial, it does not seem apparent that the
report of a truth commission is automatically more effective than trials.
There are two clear advantages to truth commissions in this regard: one is
the concentration of effort in a limited time and the capacity to assemble
information from varied sources; the other is the process that is usually
established by which the victims and their families are "listened to" and
respected, being treated with dignity unlike they were treated before. In
contrast, courts necessarily need to take on cases in a relatively piecemeal
fashion, must treat victims more or less neutrally as witnesses, and are
constrained in their assembly of evidence-and even in their analysis-by
stricter rules of admissibility.69 These comparative advantages in favor of
truth commissions, however, assume that the exercise is conducted thoughtfully, in good faith, and with adequate time and resources, which is not
always the case.
For their part, trials offer their own advantage in promoting a measure of
truth and acknowledgement. The adversarial format, with the ability to
compete with equal arms in the establishment of the truth and to confront
and cross-examine the opponent's evidence, results in a verdict that is
harder to contest. The judicial approach to evidence is certainly not
infallible, but the truth thus established has a "tested" quality that makes it
all the more persuasive. This notion also presupposes fair trial guarantees,
but as stated earlier, the international community should reject any effort
that falls below that standard.
Trials contribute to truth, however, only if they are used for what trials
69.
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are traditionally intended. Any attempt to turn them into the site of "historic"
judgments, or the instrument to "settle" long-standing political, social, or
ideological conflict runs the risk of a double failure. The trial can result in a
mockery of justice and in a contrived and unsatisfactory "truth." In order to
serve the purposes of truth, a court must strictly observe due process
guarantees and restrict its analysis to the principles of criminal law and the
law's insistence on individual responsibility for each person's conduct. Strict
adherence to principles of criminal liability does not exclude convictions on
theories of command responsibility, "control of the episode" (dominio del
hecho), and even conspiracy, so long as each element of the crime is
scrupulously established in the evidence. Adherence to such principles does
exclude convictions for forms of collaboration, sycophancy, and cheerleading
that may be morally contemptible but not criminally illegal at the time they
took place. It follows that an attempt at sweeping historic "settlement of
accounts" can result in a miscarriage of justice. 0 To quote another
important author,
[jiust as belief belongs in church, surely history education belongs in school.
When the court of law is used for history lessons, then the risk of show trials
cannot be far off. It may be that show trials can be good politics ...[b]ut good

politics don't necessarily serve the truth.

1

In fact, it is useless to try to settle a dispute over history by way of trials
because history cannot ever be "officially" written with such an effect as to
end all disputes about its interpretation. The most to which the human rights
movement can aspire is to get the facts right, so that arguments can go on
about their meaning for as long as necessary. Mark Osiel argues that trials
can nonetheless be of great service over a continuing disagreement, by
moving a conflict outside the realm of violence and constraining it within
nonlethal bounds.7 2 Osiel calls this approach liberal, and distinguishes it
from Durkheim's belief that criminal trials can obtain settled consensus over
moral fundamentals as well as from the postmodern view that any
settlement is by definition impossible, and permanent disruption should
therefore be celebrated. The merit of Osiel's argument is that it inspires
respect among adversaries and promotes social solidarity as all sides accept
the rules by which the facts are going to be established and responsibilities
determined. The continuing disagreement can also proceed over a set of
uncontested facts, and the approach "confront[s] those with something to
73
hide with evidence they have tried to keep from coming to light."
70.

See Osiel, supra note 58.

71.
72.

IAN BURUMA, THE WAGES OF GUILT: MEMORIES OF WAR IN GERMANY AND JAPAN142 (1994).

73.

Osiel, supra note 58 (discussing his thesis of how prosecution assists collective memory
and how memory furthers social solidarity).
Id. at 503.

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Vol. 19

VII. UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES AND DIFFERENT SOLUTIONS
One can clearly distinguish the problems of the transition in Eastern Europe
and its own legacies of human rights violations of the communist era from
those of Latin America. The most salient features of repression in Latin
America were extrajudicial executions, disappearances, and torture over a
relatively short but tragic period in the life of each country. For those
actions, either the state or the international community can single out a
manageable number of victims and, more importantly, identifiable perpetrators, instigators, and masterminds with relative ease. In contrast, repression
in Eastern Europe lasted several generations. It imposed a pervasive social
control through surveillance and informer networks, and asphyxiated
dissent through professional and social ostracism; but in Eastern Europe, the
repressive forces resorted to violations of the right to life and physical
integrity much less than in Latin America. 74 In such a context, criminal
responsibility is harder to establish when the actions were not illegal under
the laws in force at the time, and it is perceived that moral responsibility is
shared by large sectors of the population. For this reason, human rights
activists in those countries have generally favored memory over punishment. 71 South Africa also embarked on an ambitious program of truth and
reconciliation as part of its own attempt to leave apartheid behind.
Arguably, repression in South Africa has contained the worst features of that
of Latin America and of Eastern Europe; this makes the problems of
accountability all the more complex there.
Nevertheless, the four obligations outlined in Part IV.A are universally
applicable within the conditions of legitimacy also mentioned. In the first
place, the obligation to punish that is postulated here applies to violations
so serious that they qualify as crimes against humanity, not to acts of
pervasive surveillance, denials of free speech and association, short term
arbitrary detention, denial of due process, and suppression of religious
freedom. Even for these, however, concern for the victims does require that
the truth be known and acknowledged. The right to reparations and the
obligation to purge the security forces of elements steeped in those abject
traditions also apply.
Because the human rights movement must insist on scrupulous respect
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for due process, the "lustration" laws that have been applied in different
forms in Eastern Europe almost always constitute punishment without a fair
trial,76 and for that they deserve firm rejection. On the other hand, the
human rights movement should encourage Eastern Europeans to find ways
of having the full truth known and disseminated without adverse legal
consequences to individuals who cannot defend themselves at trial. Governments must make the files of the intelligence services available to the
public; the mistake is to take at face value the "truth" that they describe. A
process that allows individuals to demonstrate the falsehood of the substantive information contained in those files can be incorporated into the
decision to release those files. Democracy and the rule of law demand that
state files do not remain secret; their disclosure will in fact serve the
purposes of truth and reconciliation as long as it is balanced with the rights
to privacy and reputation of the individuals who may see themselves
stigmatized by the documents' publication.
Similarly, the human rights movement must criticize attempts at
prosecution under contrived principles of what was legal and what was
illegal under the laws applicable at the time. With equal firmness, the
movement must condemn attempts to punish small cogs in the wheel of
77
repression while allowing the head planners and perpetrators to go free.
The limitations and dangers of using courts to settle historic grievances can
easily be applied to the legal contortions that seem to characterize some
German attempts to punish human rights violations by East German
officials.78 Those "false starts" do not invalidate all attempts at accountability in Eastern Europe, nor do they justify the preference by many to sweep
the recent past under the rug. In particular, truth telling, integral reparations,
and purging security forces of known criminals should proceed whether or
not there are trials; and for particularly egregious human rights violations,
like the murder of Father Jerzy Popieluzko, prosecution and punishment in
a fair trial is in order.

76.

77.
78.

Lustration laws are statutes passed in post-Communist Eastern European countries to
publicize the files kept earlier by their secret police. In varying ways, these statutes
contemplate disqualification for certain administrative positions for the persons named,
in those files, as having collaborated with the Communist intelligence services. See
THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE'S
DEALING WITH THE PAST, supra note 32; TINA ROSENBERG,
GHOSTS AFTERCOMMUNISM (1995); Timothy Garton Ash, Central Europe: Present Past, THE
NEW YORK REVIEWOF BOOKS, 13 July 1995, at 21.
See ROSENBERG,
supra note 76; Ash, supra note 76.
A. James McAdams, THE HONECKER TRIAL: THE EAST GERMAN PASTAND THE GERMAN FUTURE,
WORKING PAPER# 216 (Kellogg Institute, U. of Notre Dame, Jan. 1996) (on file with author).

HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY

Vol. 19

VIII. CONCLUSION
Proponents of accountability have gained a lot of ground in the last twelve
years. The theme is firmly established in the agenda of all major challenges
of our time. A few ideological battles must still be waged, however,
especially to overcome the lack of imagination and vision that often passes
for prudence and realpolitik. As in the past, it is not enough to insist on
moral principles. The international community must acknowledge the
political constraints while insisting that everyone look at them objectively
and without preconceptions. The most important point is not so much to
impose a set of obligations upon democratic leaders, but to find the means
by which the international community effectively supports the efforts made
by some of those leaders-and by organizations of civil society-to achieve
accountability. In a world marked by globalization, such encouragement is
crucial to the legitimacy and acceptability of those efforts, and it has been
sorely missing.
It is also time to review the theoretical framework under which the
international community has discussed these issues. The presentation of the
moral principles and the political constraints made early on by Jos6
Zalaquett and Aryeh Neier, among others, were immensely useful when the
human rights movement confronted new situations with relatively little
experience to guide it. These analyses will continue to be useful, to be sure,
but after the rapid development of many new experiences, it is time to
review all of their assumptions and to examine their continued applicability.

